In this paper we study a security problem of protecting secrets with multiple protections and minimum costs. The target system is modeled as a discrete-event system (DES) in which a few states are secrets, and there are multiple subsets of protectable events with different cost levels. We formulate the problem as to ensure that every string that reaches a secret state (from the initial state) contains a specified number of protectable events and the highest cost level of these events is minimum. We first provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which this security problem is solvable, and then propose an algorithm to solve the problem based on the supervisory control theory of DES. The resulting solution is a protection policy which specifies at each state which events to protect and the highest cost level of protecting these events is minimum. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our solution with a network security example.
I. INTRODUCTION
Various security problems called cybersecurity issues have recently attracted much interest of researchers. In real systems, security problems can be caused by administrators' mistakes or vulnerabilities of products. [1] introduces practical and technical methods relevant to security issues in the real world. In general, there are some secrets in the system which intruders want to steal without raising an alert, namely without being detected, and such secrets must be protected against malicious access of intruders. At the same time, the cost to protect secrets must be taken into account because infinite protection cost is infeasible in practice.
In this paper, we employ discrete-event systems (DES) to model real systems because it is suitable for describing dynamics and architectures of computer and network systems [2] . We also utilize the fundamental techniques from the supervisory control theory (SCT) of DES to compute solutions for problems we introduce. The SCT is the theory that Ramadge and Wonham originally proposed in [3] . For a comprehensive account of the SCT, the reader is referred to [4] , and also see [5] for a historical overview of the theory.
One aspect of anonymity and secrecy that has been extensively studied in DES is opacity. This is a concept that intruders cannot identify secrets in the system because of their partial observability. For an overview of opacity, the reader is referred to [6] , and also see [7] for historical remarks on opacity. In case that opacity is violated, several methods of enforcing opacity have been reported in the literature [8] , [9] . [8] investigates making languages that the system generates opaque, namely intruders cannot determine This work was supported in part by the JSPS KAKENHI Grant no. JP16K18122. S. Matsui and K. Cai are with the Department of Electrical and Information Engineering at Osaka City University, Osaka, Japan. S. Matsui: matsui_s@c.info.eng.osaka-cu.ac.jp, K. Cai: kai.cai@eng.osaka-cu.ac.jp whether or not the system has generated a secret language, by controlling the system using the SCT. [9] introduces inserting observable events into output languages from the system to make the language which intruders observe opaque. Opacity is based on the side of intruders, assuming that they have full knowledge of the target system's structure but have only partial observability of the system's behavior. By contrast, our work in this paper stands on the side of system administrators and focuses on secret protection. We do not impose assumptions on the intruders' knowledge and observability of the system. In particular, intruders may be able to observe all events, in which case opacity fails to hold. Instead, we study the problem of protecting the secrets as much as allowed by the given resources, while balanced by the cost of such protections.
For protecting secrets, we consider that there exist some operations or events which can be protected by administrators, e.g. connecting to a network or logging into a computer. In this paper, we represent an event to which system administrators can apply a protection as a protectable event, and other events as unprotectable events. We also consider that there are multiple groups of protectable events, which have different levels of protection implementation costs. In addition, we represent secret information to be protected in the system as secret states. Secret information is a particular piece of information which should be available only to permitted users, for example, users' credit card numbers, or system privileges like root in Unix operating systems. System administrators decide which protectable events to apply protections based on a protection policy that specifies which events to be protected at a given state. Our main objective is to solve the problem of finding an effective protection policy such that all secrets are protected with a predetermined number of protections, and the highest cost level to implement these protections is minimum. To compute a solution for this security problem, we convert the problem into a control problem and resort to the SCT. Our previous work [10] introduces a problem of secret securing with at least one protection and minimum protection cost, which is a special case of the problem considered in this paper.
The main contributions of this paper are threefold. First, we formalize a new security problem as secret protection with multiple protections and minimum costs. To our best knowledge, this is the first problem studied in the literature from the viewpoint of system administrators and making no assumptions on the capability of intruders. Second, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition under which the problem is solvable. This condition characterizes the situation where every string leading to the secret states in the system has at least a specified number of protectable events. Third, we propose the concept conversion from security to control, and develop an algorithm to compute a solution for the converted and the original problem.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces a target system modeled by DES and formulates the problem of secret securing with multiple protections and minimum costs. In Section III, we first introduce a solvability condition such that the formulated problem is solvable, then convert the security problem to a control problem, and finally propose an algorithm to compute a solution for the converted and the original problem. Section IV demonstrates our algorithm with an illustrating example.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we formulate "Secret Securing with Multiple Protections and Minimum Costs Problem". Its objective is to find a policy to protect all secret states with a prescribed number of protections and minimum protection cost. Consider a task to protect all secrets in the system, and assume that administrators want to use at least m (≥ 1) protections. For this task, we need to find a protection policy to force intruders before reaching secrets to encounter m protections. Meanwhile, the protection cost must be minimum. We consider that all secrets are protected with m protections when every string reaching secrets from the initial state has at least m protectable events.
We consider secret securing with minimum costs problem (SSMCP) in the framework of discrete-event systems (DES) modeled as finite-state automata
where Q is the set of states, Σ is the set of all events, δ : Q × Σ → Q is the partial transition function, and q 0 ∈ Q is the initial state. We denote by Q s ⊆ Q the set of secret states in G. δ is extended to δ : Q × Σ * → Q in the standard manner [2] . δ(q, s)! denotes that string s from state q is defined. Σ is a disjoint union of the protectable event set Σ p and the unprotectable event set Σ up , namely
indicates the level of protection cost when the system administrator protects events in Σ i . As the index i increases, the protection cost becomes higher. We consider that the cost level of each subset is not comparable with other subsets. In other words, the cost to protect one event in Σ i is sufficiently higher than the cost to protect all events in Σ i−1 . For example, implementing a biometric protection is often more costly than setting up multiple password protections. We also denote the union of the subsets of protectable events until index k by Σ k p = k i=0 Σ i . In order to identify which transitions to protect, the system administrator needs a protection policy which specifies protectable events at suitable states. We define such a policy as a function P : Q → Pwr(Σ p ) where Pwr(Σ p ) is the power set of Σ p . For example, P(q) = { σ i , σ j } indicates that protectable events σ i and σ j are protected at state q.
For clarity of presentation, we henceforth focus on the case m = 2. The case m ≥ 3 can be addressed in the same fashion (but with more complicated notation). The case m = 1 has been solved in [10] , which is a special case of the problem addressed in this paper. We first define the following concept indicating that the secret states are protected with at least two protections.
Definition 1 (2-secure reachability). Consider a plant G in (1) . The secret state set Q s is securely reachable with at least two protectable events (2- 
Note that s in (2) can contain two or more protectable events in Σ k p , which means that intruders have to penetrate at least two protections to reach secrets. When condition (2) does not hold, there exists a string which contains one or no protected event and reaches a secret state -this is the situation we try to avoid.
Next, we formulate the following security problem with Definition 1.
Problem 2 (Secret Securing with Two Protections and Minimum Costs Problem, or 2-SSMCP). Consider a plant G in (1) . Find a protection policy P :
Let us explain Problem 2 with an illustrating example of a real system. Fig. 1 represents a computer network composed of two different local-area networks (LAN) and two servers. Consider a situation where a user uses a laptop and wants to browse his or her secret file in the server via Wi-Fi. q 0 means "the client is not connected", and q 1 is a wireless router. Accordingly, σ 0 and σ 1 indicate connecting to and disconnecting from the router. q 2 and q 4 represent being in the respective LAN, that is, the client has been assigned an IP address. σ 2 , σ 3 , σ 8 , and σ 9 are operations of connecting to and disconnecting from networks q 2 and q 4 . q 5 is the server where the client's secret file is stored. q 3 is a bastion server different from q 5 , which allows clients to access to q 5 through q 3 , namely σ 7 . Accordingly, σ 4 and σ 5 are logging on to and logging out from q 3 . Users in LANs q 2 and q 4 can access to q 5 directly. In order to protect the secret file against malicious access of intruders, the network administrator must protect some suitable events in the plant, and wish to do so with minimum cost. Let Σ p = Σ 0∪ Σ 1∪ Σ 2 be the set of protectable events,
Also let Σ up = { σ 1 , σ 3 , σ 5 , σ 7 , σ 9 } be the set of unprotectable events, and Σ = Σ p∪ Σ up . The secret state q 5 is depicted as a shaded state in Fig. 1 ; thus Q s = { q 5 }. The 2-SSMCP is the problem of finding a protection policy which protects at least two protectable events in every path from q 0 to q 5 with minimum protection cost. In other words, every string reaching q 5 from q 0 must have at least two protectable events, and the index k ∈ { 0, 1, 2 } of Σ k p of these protectable events must be the smallest.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the solvability of Problem 2, and compute a solution by resorting to the SCT. Due to space limit, we refer the reader to [11] for all the proofs of the presented results.
A. Solvability of 2-SSMCP
The following theorem provides a necessary and sufficient condition under which there exists a solution of Problem 2. Condition (3) means that when k = 0, secret states in Q s can be protected with at least two protections using protectable events in Σ 0 p = Σ 0 . The meaning of (4) is that when 1 ≤ k ≤ n−1, secret states in Q s can be protected with at least two protections using protectable events in Σ k p , and secrets can be protected with only one protection or cannot be protected using protectable events only in Σ k−1 p .
B. Policy Computation
In this subsection, we compute a protection policy when the solvability condition of Problem 2 in Theorem 4 holds. To compute a protection policy, we convert the security problem (Problem 2) to a control problem and resort to the SCT. An overview of our concept conversion is shown in Fig. 2 
where Σ = Σ c∪ Σ uc , and Σ c =˙
. . , n − 1 }, denotes the partition of protectable events, indicating the cost level with the index i. As Σ k p , we denote the union of the subsets of controllable events until index k by Σ k c =˙ k i=0 Σ i . Note that by the conversion, protection policy P is converted to control policy D : Q → Pwr(Σ c ) which is the supervisor's decision of which controllable events to disable at any given state. Letting S = (X, Σ, ξ, x 0 ) be a supervisor which is a subautomaton of the plant G, D is given by
Based on the above conversion, the following definition and problem are converted from Definition 1 and Problem 2.
Definition 5 (2-controllable reachability). Consider a plant G in (5) . The secret state set Q s is controllably reachable with at least two controllable events (2-controllably reachable) w.r.t. G and Σ k c =˙ k i=0 Σ i if the following condition holds:
Problem 6 (Reachability Control with Two Controllable Events and Minimum Costs Problem, or 2-RCMCP). Consider a plant G in (5) . Find a control policy D s.t. Q s is 2-controllably reachable w.r.t. Σ k c and k is the least index. Next, the following is a necessary and sufficient condition under which Problem 6 is solvable. To compute a control policy which disables at least two controllable events in every string reaching secret states from the initial state, we propose Algorithm 1. This algorithm computes two supervisors S 0 and S 1 for G in (5) . Each supervisor provides a different control policy such that every string reaching secret states has at least one controllable event with minimum cost. To compute the first supervisor S 0 , we design the control specification G K by removing the secret states in Q s and the transitions to and from removed secret states:
Note that in real systems, secret states are still reachable. It is not suitable to disable events to protect secrets because it can inhibit users' normal behavior.
Algorithm 1 RCMC2
Input: G in (5), G K in (10) Output: Supervisor automata S 0 and S 1 1: Compute S 0 , k 0 by RCMC1 with inputs G, G K 2: if S 0 is nonempty then 3:
Derive D 0 from S 0 by (6) 4:
Form G 1 = (Q, Σ 1 , δ 1 , q 0 ) as in (12) 5:
return S 0 , S 1 9: end if 10: return Empty supervisors 11: 12: function RCMC1(G, G K ) 13:
for k = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1 do Fig. 3 . From (10), secret state Q s = { q 5 } and transitions (q 2 , σ 6 , q 5 ), (q 3 , σ 7 , q 5 ), and (q 4 , σ 10 , q 5 ) are removed from the plant G in Fig. 1 .
To proceed, we need several standard concepts of the SCT. Consider a plant G in (5) . Let K = L(G K ) ⊆ L(G) be a specification language. From [4] , K is controllable if KΣ uc ∩ L(G) ⊆ K where K is the prefix closure of K. The family C(K) is the set of all controllable sublanguages of K, and denoted by C(K) :
The supremal controllable sublanguage of K is given by [4] ) Let G = (Q, Σ uc∪ Σ c , δ, q 0 ) be a plant and K ⊆ L(G) be a specification language. The following holds:
From Lemma 11 and the construction of G K in (10), letting K = L(G K ), the supervisor S 0 = sup C(K) w.r.t. G in (5) and Σ k c is nonempty if and only if every string which contains events in Σ k c in G and reaches secret states has at least one controllable event. In other words, sup C(K) = ∅ w.r.t. G and Σ k c if and only if [∀s ∈ (Σ\Σ k c ) * ]δ(q 0 , s) ∈ Q s . Accordingly, the RCMC1 function in Algorithm 1 returns a supervisor which specifies controllable events such that every string reaching secret states from the initial state has at least one controllable event. The index k which RCMC1 returns is minimum because the index in RCMC1 starts from 0 and is incremented by 1 at each iteration.
Let D 0 be a control policy derived from the first supervisor S 0 as in (6) . To compute the second supervisor S 1 , we relabel the transitions specified by D 0 to distinguish the disabled transitions and other non-disabled transitions. Relabeled controllable transitions are treated as uncontrollable. Accordingly, a new plant G 1 is defined as follows:
Note that Σ uc1 is the subset of uncontrollable events in G 1 . We call the sequence from (12) to (17) that defines G 1 "relabeling".
Example 12. Consider the plant G in Example 3. The control policy D 0 derived from the first supervisor for Example 3 is as follows:
The protection policy P 0 derived from D 0 by the conversion Fig. 4 . The plant G with the protection policy P 0 is shown in Fig. 4 . " " means that the event is protected. Before we compute the second supervisor to obtain a solution for Problem 6, we relabel the disabled transitions D 0 specifies as follows:
Based on this relabeling, a new plant G 1 = (Q, Σ 1 , δ 1 , q 0 ) Fig. 1 is shown in Fig. 5 . Finally, letting δ 1 K = δ 1 \{ (q, σ, q ) | q, q ∈ Q s , σ ∈ Σ 1 }, we design the specification automaton G K1 = (Q \ Q s , Σ 1 , δ 1 K , q 0 ) for the relabeled plant G 1 to compute the second supervisor S 1 . For Example 3, G K1 is depicted in Fig. 6 . Algorithm 1 returns either empty or nonempty supervisor automata S 0 and S 1 . If Algorithm 1 returns two nonempty supervisors, there exists a control policy D 0 by the supervisor S 0 such that L(S 0 ) = sup C(L(G K )) and D 1 by S 1 such
). From D 0 and D 1 , a solution for Problem 6, namely D : Q → Pwr(Σ c ), is given by
In other words, (20) means merging D 0 and D 1 . Each control policy specifies controllable events such that every string reaching secrets has at least one controllable event. Therefore, D in (20) specifies at least two controllable events in every string reaching secret states from the initial state. Index k 1 in Algorithm 1 line 7 is equal to or larger than k 0 in line 1, namely k 0 ≤ k 1 . This is because k 0 is the least index such that there exists a control policy D 0 to make secret states unreachable in G. Moreover, letting Σ k c be the subset of controllable events that D in (20) specifies to disable, index k is minimum because k 1 is minimum and k = k 1 . Thus, the condition in Proposition 7 is satisfied with k = k 1 in (8) and (9) .
Proposition 13. Algorithm 1 returns nonempty supervisors iff Problem 6 is solvable. From (20), a solution for Problem 2, namely P : Q → Pwr(Σ p ), is given by
where P 0 and P 1 are derived from D 0 and D 1 respectively by inverse conversion. The least index is k = k 1 . Finally, we state our main result.
Theorem 14. Consider a plant G in (1). If Problem 2 is solvable, then the protection policy P in (21) is a solution for Problem 2.
IV. ILLUSTRATING EXAMPLE
Let us take Example 3 again to demonstrate our developed solution for 2-SSMCP.
Consider the plant G in Example 3. We first convert 2-SSMCP (Problem 2) to 2-RCMCP (Problem 6) by converting protectable events to controllable events. In Algorithm 1 line 1, from Example 12, S 0 is nonempty. In line 3, D 0 is in (18). In line 4, the new plant G 1 derived from G and D 0 by the relabeling is in Fig. 5 . In line 6, the specification automaton G K1 for G 1 is shown in Fig. 6 . Call function RCMC1 at line 7. In line 13, let K = L(G K1 ). In line 14, initially k = 0:
Thus increment k by 1, i.e. k = 1:
Then
So in line 18, function RCMC1 returns S 1 with L(S 1 ) = sup C(K), and k = 1. Then, Algorithm 1 returns nonempty supervisors S 0 and S 1 . According to S 1 , a control policy D 1 for G 1 is as follows: Fig. 7 illustrates the plant G with the protection policy P. From P, the secret q 5 is 2-securely reachable because all strings from the initial state q 0 reaching the secret state have at least two protectable events. For example, in real systems, protecting σ 0 can be implemented by setting up a Wi-Fi password for the wireless router. Additionally, protections for σ 4 , σ 6 and σ 10 can be implemented by configuration of user authentication in each of the servers q 3 and q 5 . 
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced the problem of protecting secret states in the system with at least m (≥ 1) protections and minimum protection costs (m-SSMCP). This problem has been formulated as finding a protection policy such that every string reaching secret states from the initial state has at least m protectable events, and the protection cost is minimum. To clarify our presentation, we have focused on the case m = 2. The case m ≥ 3 can be dealt with in the same fashion, and is referred to [11] . We have presented a solution algorithm for 2-SSMCP which leads to an effective protection policy. Finally, we have demonstrated our solution with a network example.
In future work, we aim to investigate a situation where secrets have different importance and administrators are concerned with the balance between protection cost and secret importance.
